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THE CHANGING WORLD OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
MARIA O'BRIEN HYLTON*
INTRODUCTION
When I graduated from law school in 1985, there were no courses
offered in employee benefits law. Nor, as near as I can recall, was
ERISA ever discussed in any of the labor and employment classes I
took. There was no mention in the introductory labor law course or in
other classes about employment discrimination, union organizing, and
employment arbitration. Now, in contrast, many law schools include a
course on employee benefits and ERISA, and students hoping to
work in the labor and employment area frequently find that ERISA
work is plentiful, and traditional NLRA work is not. This, of course,
reflects larger changes in the market for legal services. This past term,
the U.S. Supreme Court did not decide a single NLRA case. There is
anecdotal evidence which suggests that unions avoid federal litigation
whenever possible, because the courts are perceived to be hostile to
their interests. Whatever the explanation, the action in the labor and
employment arena has clearly moved from traditional labor law to
employment law and employee benefits.
The attention that law schools now give to employee benefits is
also increasingly being reflected in the popular media. I imagine that
many readers remember December 2001, when it seemed impossible
to read a newspaper without encountering a story about the Enron
scandal. Most of the stories made mention of the consequences for
Enron employees of pension plans that were heavily invested in now-
worthless Enron stock. For a while there were calls to amend ERISAI
to prohibit these kinds of investment options, but those calls have
largely died down and the public has turned its concerns toward other
things.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A version of this paper was deliv-
ered as the 25th Annual Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at Chicago-Kent College of Law in April
2003. I benefited from comments by conference participants and from the excellent research
assistance of Brian N. Webster and Kathleen Kean. Thanks also to William A. Kaleva for help
in editing the manuscript.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 etseq. (2000).
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Enron, of course, was not the only corporate scandal to break
early in the new century. Global Crossing and WorldCom became
household names, in large part because of the exceptional acts of cor-
porate greed they exposed, but also because of the impact of the
scandals on employee benefits.2 The focus on the benefits dimension
of these crises generated, I think, considerable anxiety both inside
and outside the academy about the reliability of our present system of
benefits regulation. This Article will discuss that system, and, in par-
ticular, the external events which have made improving the present
weak regulatory regime difficult. I will argue that the dramatic decline
in union density, combined with the health insurance crisis and prob-
lems with ERISA that have resisted solution, are at the core of the
vague sense of panic many employees feel about the future of their
benefits.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
A. The Decline in Union Density
Union density in the private sector has been declining for the last
fifty years.3 The general decline in union density has been accompa-
nied by a shift of union power from the private sector into the public
2. See Greg Gatlin, Suit Says Polaroid Cut off Aid for the Disabled, BOSTON HERALD,
July 9, 2003, at 33; Richard Mullins, Lawyers OK Deal in Global Lawsuits, ROCHESTER
DEMOCRAT & CHRON., June 26, 2003, at 1A (noting that Global Crossing's 2001 bankruptcy
devastated the pension accounts of thousands of people in the area who worked at Frontier,
which Global Crossing acquired and later broke up for sale. "A key hurdle in the negotiations
was crossed when insurance companies agreed that policies they hold protecting Global execu-
tives could be used to provide some money toward a potential settlement [with employees who
lost their jobs]." The proposed settlement would make $200 million available to 13,000 current
and former Global Crossing employees.).
3. Seymour Martin Lipset & Ivan Katchanovski, The Future of Private Sector Unions in
the U.S., in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (James T.
Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2002). In 1953, 35.7 percent of the non-agricultural private
workforce was unionized. That number has since steadily declined to a recent low of 9 percent.
Id. However, there has not been an associated decline in union density in the public sector.
Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America 2-5 (Boston Univ. Sch. of
Law Working Paper No. 03-14, 2003), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/
pdf__files[HyltonK073003.pdf. Additionally, the rate of decline varies with geography: union
membership rates are higher than the national average in traditional strongholds like Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, but the percentages are much lower in states such as North and
South Dakota. See Douglas Clement, Labor Pains, FEDGAZETTE, http://minneapolisfed.org/
pubs/fedgaz/01-05/labor.cfm (May 2001). Michigan's level of union density as of the year 2000 is
20.8 percent; Wisconsin's union density is 17.6 percent; Montana's union density is 13.9 percent;
North Dakota's union density is 6.5 percent; and South Dakota's union density is 5.5 percent.
Additionally, compared to the 9 percent national decline over the last five years, union density
has fallen faster in all Ninth District states but Wisconsin. Id.
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sector.4 This is an important facet of the current state of employee
benefits because unions were once the vehicle by which employees
effectively negotiated with their employers. As the power of unions
declines, workers, particularly those in the private sector, are left
without significant bargaining power in all matters relating to em-
ployment, including benefits.
That the decline in union density suggests a decline in bargaining
power is made clear when one considers which employees have pen-
sion plans. Approximately 70 percent of union workers in private
industry have defined-benefit pension plans.5 Yet, only 16 percent of
private sector nonunion workers have similar plans.6 These statistics
suggest at least two conclusions: (1) private sector union strength is
declining, and (2) a correlation exists between union density and pen-
sion coverage.
Some have argued that the link between density and pension
coverage is related to a worker's worth: if a company can find less
costly workers to perform the same job functions as its current work-
ers, the worth of the more costly batch is devalued.7
A variety of explanations have emerged to account for this de-
cline and the subsequent unease about the future of benefits.8 Among
commentators that are sympathetic to unions, the leading theory for
the marked decline in union density is employer resistance.9 Other
4. Hylton, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that 44 percent of unionized workers are employed in
the public sector).
5. Clement, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. See id. The Minnesota Construction Trades Organizing Association ("MCTOA")
staged a rally at Minnesota's State Capitol demanding the repeal of a property tax exemption
given to builders of a 540-megawatt power plant in southern Minnesota. The MCTOA claimed
the plant hired out-of-state workers to build the plant and undercut prevailing union wage rates.
The builders offered $9 an hour for all workers, instead of the $13 hourly wage commonly paid
in that part of the state for day laborers, and the over $30 an hour for electricians and pipe-
fitters. Clement argues that management focuses on the "bottom line," being profitability. Id.
Because globalization opens U.S. markets to low-cost producers from around the world, finding
cheaper labor is an "undeniable attraction." Id. These competitive forces close mines, lumber
mills, and factories in the Upper Midwest and funnel labor either to largely nonunion states in
the South or overseas, where unions may not exist and prevailing wages are far lower. See also
Gary Olson, Class Society Grows as Labor Unions Decline, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.),
Sept. 2, 2002, at A9.
8. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV 351, 362-77 (2002); Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The
Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's Decline, 16 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive
Product Markets, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 3, 4-9 (1993).
9. Estreicher, supra note 8, at 4 (citing Richard B. Freeman, Contraction and Expansion:
The Divergence of Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the United States, in LABOR
2004]
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proposed explanations for the decline in union density include the
new global economy, the changing composition of the workforce, the
growing contingent workforce, deficiencies in the NLRA structure,
the nature of unionism, and individualism.1,
The most troubling of these explanations are employer resis-
tance, the global economy, and the contingent workforce. These fac-
tors are most troubling from a benefits perspective because all can be
linked to a decrease in the cost of benefits to the employer.
Employers are, of course, interested in maximizing profits. In-
herent in the goal of maximizing profits is the need to minimize costs.
An employer that can eliminate or reduce the cost of benefits will be
a step ahead of its benefits-paying competition. Unions are most suc-
cessful when they have a monopoly in a market because a monopoly
takes wages out of competition-all employers must pay the same
amount for the same work and consumers have no choice but to pay
the labor costs." A globalizing economy, however, allows employers
to reduce the high cost of union labor by making it possible for em-
ployers to hire people in developing countries, where labor is cheap
and unions are not a factor. 2 This in turn puts wages back in competi-
tion. An employer that is paying for union labor and the associated
benefits may find that his customers would rather buy more cheaply
from an employer with reduced labor and benefits costs.
The growing contingent workforce may also bear some responsi-
bility for the continuing decline in union density. 3 The argument is
that the contingent workforce is an attractive source of labor for em-
ployers that seek to reduce costs because much of the contingent
workforce is not afforded the same protections and benefits as long-
term employees, and further, the remaining contingent workers gen-
erally do not have a vested interest in improving working conditions.14
Because employers are not required to extend benefits to some mem-
MARKETS IN ACTION: ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS 221 (1989); Richard B. Freeman &
Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 351 (1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983)).
10. Befort, supra note 8, at 362-77.
11. Id. (citing THOMAS KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 26 (1986)); Estreicher, supra note 8, at 10; RICHARD D. FREEMAN &
JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO?, at 82 (1984).
12. Befort, supra note 8, at 362-64.
13. The contingent workforce refers to workers that are "independent contractors, con-
tracted workers, leased employees, part-time employees, and temporary employees." Befort,
supra note 8, at 367.
14. Id. at 366-71.
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bers of the contingent workforce" and because other members of the
contingent workforce lack incentive to effect change,'16 the contingent
workforce offers a cheaper alternative to the traditional long-term
employee.
As I have argued elsewhere, my view is that the contingent work-
force explanation for the decline in benefits and an increase in bene-
fits-anxiety is a weak one. "Many of the employee benefits that
workers care about most deeply are entirely discretionary with em-
ployers. There is no federal or state health requirement that employ-
ers offer insurance, disability (short- or long-term coverage), private
pensions, or vacations (paid or unpaid)."'7
B. Health Insurance
1. The Growing Uninsured Population
The forty-two to sixty million people who lack health insurance
arguably are the problem with which benefits reformers are most con-
cerned.'8 Many of these uninsured Americans are employed. In fact, a
substantial sub-group of uninsured Americans are families with two
wage earners but no health insurance for themselves or their children.
How does this happen?
The absence of coverage generally results either from the em-
ployer choosing not to offer health insurance as part of its compensa-
tion package or the inability of the employee to afford his or her
portion of the premium. Health care costs have been on the rise for
the last several years-double-digit rates of increase appear to be the
norm-and there is no reason to think that this trend will end soon.19
15. Legally, independent contractors, contracted workers, and leased employees are not
employees of the entity that is benefiting from their services. For this reason, these employees
are not entitled to benefits. Id. at 370.
16. Temporary employees and part-time employees may find that because they are only at
one location for a relatively short period of time, they lack an incentive to organize and to effect
change. Id. at 370-71.
17. Maria O'Brien Hylton, Legal and Policy Implications of the Flexible Employment
Relationsnip, 17 J. LAB. RES. 583, 585 (1996).
18. H.R. Comm. on Education and the Workforce Subcomm. on Employer-Employee
Relations, The Small Business Health Fairness Act--Hearings of H.R. 660, 108th Cong.
19. See Judith Nemes, Employers Taking Steps to Manage Hospital Costs, Bus. INS., Feb. 3,
2003, at 21 (citing a Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association study that found hospital services
costs for patients continue to rise despite hospital and health system consolidation, which should
have led to lower charges. The report noted that for every one percent increase in market share
from consolidation, there was a two percent jump in inpatient charges).
2004]
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In fact, the Supreme Court's recent ERISA decision in Kentucky As-
sociation of Health Plans, Inc., v. Miller suggests that the cost of pro-
viding health insurance to employees will only continue to increase. 20
2. The Supreme Court and the Cost of Health Insurance
The recent decision upholding any willing provider ("AWP")
laws will undermine the already tenuous ability of Health Mainte-
nance Organizations ("HMOs") to control prices by forcing providers
to accept lower rates in exchange for guaranteed patient volume. In
Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller21, various HMOs
doing business in Kentucky sued the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Insurance.22 The HMOs challenged Kentucky's AWP laws on
the ground that ERISA pre-empted such provisions. 23 The district
court, the Sixth Circuit, and the Supreme Court all held that the AWP
laws survive ERISA because the laws "regulate insurance" within the
meaning of ERISA's savings clause.24
The statutory requirements that the plaintiffs challenged are part
of Kentucky's Health Care Reform Act ("HCRA").25 In 1994, Ken-
tucky required health insurers to recognize "any provider who is lo-
cated within the geographical coverage area of the health benefit plan
and is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation es-
tablished by the health benefit plan." 26 In 1996, Kentucky enacted a
similar provision for chiropractors.2 The plaintiffs alleged that these
provisions are pre-empted by ERISA because they relate to an em-
ployee benefit plan within the meaning of section 11441 (a) of ERISA,
and that ERISA section 1144(b)(2)(A), which saves laws that regu-
20. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003) (holding that ERISA
does not preempt AWP provisions).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1474.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1471; see also Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employ-
ment Decisions: 2002-2003 Term, 19 LAB. LAWYER 247, 248 n.14 (2003) (citing HMO Ruling
Gives Patients Wider Pick, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2003, at A53; Linda Greenhouse, States Can
Force H.M.O.'s to Accept Any Qualified Doctor, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2003, at A16; Patrick Howington, High Court Backs State on HMO Regulations; Kentucky's
Law Allowing Access to Doctors Upheld, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Apr. 3, 2003, at 1A).
25. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-100(4)(a) (repealed 1999) [hereinafter KHCRA].
26. Id. at § 304.17A-110(3) (repealed 1999) (current version at § 304.17A-270 (Banks-
Baldwin 2001)).
27. Id. at § 304.17A-121(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2001).
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late insurance, does not save the state law provisions because they do
not regulate insurance.28
The plaintiffs challenged the provisions because the provisions
threatened their core method of doing business. HMOs control costs
and quality by establishing provider networks for their customers.2 9 A
doctor who joins a provider network agrees to charge lower fees for
services; the quid pro quo is that the doctors access a large patient
group unavailable to non-participating physicians. 0 The plaintiffs
alleged that the AWP provisions would thwart their attempts to con-
trol cost and quality, and ultimately deny customers the economic
benefits of provider networks.31
The district court held that although the AWP laws do relate to
an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, the laws are
not pre-empted because they "regulate insurance.32 The Sixth Circuit
heard the case on appeal and also found that the AWP provisions
survive ERISA because they "regulate insurance."33 The Sixth Circuit
applied two sets of reasoning to the case: a common sense interpreta-
tion of the meaning of "regulate insurance" and the McCarran-
Ferguson factors.3 The Sixth Circuit found that, under each analysis,
the AWP provisions "regulate insurance.""3
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit but held that the
McCarran-Ferguson factors are not the proper approach to an
ERISA pre-emption case.36 Rather, the Court held that a state law is
a law that "'regulates insurance' under § 1144(b)(2)(A)," if it satisfies
two requirements.37 "First, the state law must be specifically directed
toward entities engaged in insurance. Second,... the state law must
substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer
and the insured."38 The Court found that Kentucky's law satisfied
each of these tests,3 9 and drew an analogy to state statutes that require
28. Ky. Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1474.
29. Id.
30. Cmty. Health Partners v. Kentucky ex. rel. Nichols, 14 F. Supp. 2d 991, 993 (1998).
31. Ky. Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1474.
32. Nichols, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04.
33. Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 372 (6th Cir. 2000).
34. Id. at 364.
35. Id. at 372.
36. Ky. Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1479 ("Today we make a clean break from the McCar-
ran-Ferguson factors.").
37. Id.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id.
2004]
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attorneys to attend CLE classes each year. The Court noted that such
a requirement regulates the practice of law because it imposes a con-
dition, "which substantially affect[s] the product delivered by lawyers
to their clients."4°
It is easy to see how this decision opens the door to increased
health insurance premiums. HMOs can place effective cost controls
on the practice of medicine by requiring that doctors charge lower
rates. Doctors agree to this arrangement with HMOs because they
know that being a member of a provider network results in a higher
patient volume. If the HMOs must recognize AWP laws, the HMOs
can no longer guarantee a higher patient volume and, therefore, doc-
tors will be less inclined to agree to the cost control measures of the
HMOs.
C. Benefits-Related Scandals
Each corporate scandal produces short-lived calls to reform
ERISA.41 ERISA encompasses most private employer pension
plans,42 which fall into two categories: defined-benefit plans and de-
fined-contribution plans. A defined-benefit plan provides an em-
ployee with a specific benefit expressed as an amount payable to the
employee when the employee retires. The benefit to be paid is fre-
quently based on the employee's years of service and a percentage of
compensation paid. Also, the benefit may account for the employee's
expected Social Security income. A defined-contribution plan pro-
vides for an individual account in which the actual benefit provided
40. Id. at 1477.
41. See 120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186 (state-
ment of Sen. Williams, introducing the Conference Report to ERISA); see also Bradley P.
Rothman, Note, 401(k) Plans in the Wake of the Enron Debacle, 54 FLA. L. REV. 921 (2002).
Congress enacted ERISA to protect employee retirement benefits. Id. at 924. To that end,
ERISA contains fiduciary rules governing plan administration and investment. Id. ERISA also
established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") to guard an employee's
retirement assets against an insolvent employer. Id. at 928. ERISA therefore protects employ-
ees against threats to their retirement benefits including fiduciary breaches, poor investments,
and employer insolvency.
42. See John R. Keville, Note, Retire at Your Own Risk: ERISA's Return on Investment?,
68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 527, 528 (1994) (citing A.B.A. SECriON OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 16 (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 1991); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)
(1988); Hollingshead v. Burford Equip. Co., 747 F. Supp. 1421, 1427-28 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (hold-
ing that ERISA covers pension plans if one establishes that an employer's acts "necessarily"
evince intent to form or maintain a plan to provide specific benefits)).
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represents amounts contributed by the employee or employer, plus
investment earnings gained thereon.43
Congress created ERISA to protect the interests of pension plan
participants and their beneficiaries. The idea was to improve pension
plans through the regulation of the design and operation of benefits
plans, 4 and to create the means to enforce the regulations and to es-
tablish pension insurance to protect against defined-benefit plan fail-
ure.4 5 Congress's motivation was also based in part on concerns
arising out of the full reporting and disclosure provisions of the Wel-
fare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 ("WPPDA").46 Some
legislators felt that WPPDA did not do enough to protect employee
benefit plan assets from imprudent investing and misappropriation of
plan funds. At the time, many believed that existing state and federal
laws were not effective in preventing or correcting disclosure abuses.
Consequently, Congress designed ERISA to impose stricter fiduciary
obligations on those who have discretion or responsibility for manag-
ing and handling pension and welfare plan assets. Some would argue
that these obligations have contributed to the current instability of
benefits.
1. Varity and Fraud
In Texas they may say, "Remember the Alamo"; in the benefits
world, many of us who worry about adequate deterrents to fraud cry,
"Remember Varity!" Varity Corp. v. Howe may stand for many
things, but one is certainly the proposition that ERISA is an ineffec-
tive deterrent for plan sponsor fraud.47
The Varity plaintiffs used ERISA to sue their former employer
to reinstate them in the benefits plan.48 The case arose out of Varity's
43. See BURTON T. BEAM, JR. & JOHN J. MCFADDEN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (3d ed.
1992).
44. See Keville, supra note 42, at 532-33 (noting that ERISA protects the rights of pension
and welfare plan participants by providing statutory enforcement rights and access to the fed-
eral court system); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing a participant or benefici-
ary to bring a civil action against an administrator who fails to provide plan information upon
request in order to recover benefits due, to enforce rights, or to clarify rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (empowering a participant, beneficiary,
fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor to bring a civil action for breach of fiduciary duty).
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
46. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958).
47. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
48. Id. The plaintiffs asserted a breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) and
asserted a cause of action under ERISA § 502(a)(3) (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). Id. at 492, 494-95.
20041
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"Project Sunshine" business plan .49 After Varity realized that a num-
ber of its divisions were losing money, Varity attempted to salvage
the rest of the company by restructuring the failing divisions into a
new, separately incorporated subsidiary. 0 Varity's management ex-
pected the new subsidiary, Massey Combines, to fail, but still encour-
aged employees to voluntarily transfer their employment and benefit
plans to the new division.51
To persuade the employees of the failing divisions to voluntarily
transfer, Varity held a meeting in which management told the em-
ployees their benefits would be secure and would not change if they
voluntarily transferred the responsibility of managing their benefits to
Massey Combines.5 2 According to the courts, however, Varity knew
that Massey Combines was insolvent from the day of its creation and
it hid a $46 million negative net worth by overvaluing its assets and
underestimating its liabilities. 3 Varity was successful in persuading
approximately 1,500 employees to voluntarily transfer their employ-
ment and benefits to Massey Combines.14 These employees made the
transfer relying on Varity's assurances that they would be secure in
the new company.5
Massey Combines was unsuccessful from the beginning: it re-
corded a loss of $88 million at the end of its first year and was in re-
ceivership at the end of its second year, under which employees lost
their non-pension benefits.56 Some of these employees, and several
retirees whose benefit obligations Varity had assigned to Massey
Combines, brought suit.57 The plaintiffs wanted to receive the benefits
they would have been entitled to under their old benefits plans, had
they never transferred to Massey Combines.58
The District Court and the Eighth Circuit each found for the
plaintiffs.5 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered
whether ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorized relief for individuals or
49. Id. at 493.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 493-94.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 494.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 495.
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whether it only authorized relief for the plan.6° The Supreme Court
analyzed the language of ERISA § 502(a) and determined that the
plaintiffs could proceed under (a)(3), and also determined that deny-
ing the plaintiffs a remedy would not serve an ERISA-related pur-
pose .61
ERISA, as all benefits practitioners know, does not permit the
imposition of punitive or exemplary awards, no matter how egregious
the conduct. The absence of punitive damages as a weapon in the
arsenal against fraud necessarily means that the problem of under-
deterrence lurks everywhere. Many others have commented on the
need to expand the range of ERISA penalties, 62 so I will only note
that there is a well-developed body of literature on deterrence and
the expected consequences of inadequate deterrence. 63 All of the ar-
guments, whether made in the context of torts or criminal law, apply
to the kind of behavior at stake in Varity and the subsequent recent
scandals with equal force. It is not unreasonable to presume that em-
ployers and plan sponsors are rational actors who are capable of rec-
ognizing the attractiveness of fraud where the downside is only a
speculative, future obligation to make the victim whole. No matter
how disgusted a court may be by blatantly deceptive practices, the
plan sponsor knows that the court will be powerless to mete out the
most severe sanction.
I have never understood the arguments I have heard against
permitting the assessment of punitive damages in ERISA cases-i.e.,
that plan sponsors are so well behaved that the sanction is simply un-
necessary. During my recent year of work with the ABA's Labor and
60. Id. The Supreme Court also considered whether Varity was acting as a fiduciary when
it encouraged the employees to voluntarily transfer to Massey Combines and whether Varity
breached the fiduciary duty ERISA § 404(a) imposes on plan fiduciaries. The District Court, the
Eighth Circuit, and the Supreme Court each answered those questions in the affirmative. Id. at
494-507.
61. Id. at 507-15.
62. William B. Schwartz, The Correct Rx to Target Malpractice, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000,
at B7; Jamie Cort, Holding HMOs Accountable for Their Egregious Conduct, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 2,
1998, at 13. Congress responded to some of these concerns by broadening liability for ERISA
violations under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 902-904 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(1)(C)
(2000 & Supp. 2003)).
63. See Mosler v. S/P Enters., 888 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Judge Easterbrook
noted that if a defendant will not be caught each time, fraud is profitable if the defendant is only
required to return what he gained); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt.a (1977); see
also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 877-945 (1998); Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 72-73 (1993) (concluding that because administrative law does not adequately deter
illegal conduct, common law liability is sometimes necessary).
20041
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Employment Law Section, this argument was made to me on more
than one occasion. When I hear it I always have to suppress an urge
to giggle, because the premise-i.e., that all plan sponsors are honor-
able and free from impulses to commit fraud-has been so battered
by recent events. Even if fraud was rare, that would only suggest, I
think, that we would expect to see punitive damages imposed infre-
quently in a properly functioning system. Infrequent fraud is not an
argument against the propriety of imposing extraordinary awards
when the facts so warrant.
2. Under-Diversification
Even when employees have access to benefits, various external
corporate and economic factors can cause them to lose those bene-
fits.64 One thing we should have learned from the socially responsible
investing debate of the 1980s is that we should not whole-heartedly
subscribe to investment strategies that have not been thoroughly ana-
lyzed.
Employee Stock Option Plans ("ESOPs") have recently come
under intense scrutiny in light of recent developments at United Air-
lines. An ESOP is a qualified plan that invests employees' money in
the employer's equities.65 An employee that participates in an ESOP
may find that his investment is heavily invested in the employer's
equities. Thus, the employees are doubly invested in the economic
success of the company: not only is the employee at risk of losing his
64. See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 104 F.3d 105 (7th Cir. 1997). United Air-
lines and several unions reached an agreement in which the employees accepted fewer fringe
benefits in exchange for voting control of the company. Id. at 106. This agreement increased the
likelihood that employees would retain their jobs because the company's labor costs would be
substantially lower as a result of the concessions. Id. United created a special issue of preferred
stock carrying a 7 percent dividend to fund the employee stock ownership plan. Id. The number
of preferred shares was set at 55 percent of the total number of common shares and preferred
shares. Id. Rather than giving the preferred shares to the ESOP outright, United gave the ESOP
the money to buy the shares from United. Id. According to the court, the transfer effectively
was a gift to the ESOP rather than a sale, since the ESOP did not pay for the stock and United
did not receive anything in return for the stock. Id. The court found that the reason for the
dummy sale was to obtain tax benefits when United borrowed the money to finance the ESOP's
buyout of the shareholders. See 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(9) (2000). The higher the price of the shares
"sold" to the ESOP, the greater the greater the tax advantage to United because, subject to
various limitations, an employer may deduct its contributions to an ESOP or other employee
benefit plan when they are made. Summers, 104 F.3d at 106. At the same time, employees defer
income tax until they actually receive benefits from the plan. Id. at 106-07. Therefore, as the
ERISA fiduciary for these employees, State Street Bank had to fix a price for the preferred
stock that would make the ESOP's investment in that stock appear to be a reasonable invest-
ment of plan assets. Id. at 107.
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-11 (1977).
[Vol 79:625
THE CHANGING WORLD OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
job if the company does not do well, but the success of the employee's
investments will track the success of the company. The problem with
this arrangement is that even the most paternalistic companies can
and do fail. Ask the people who worked for Polaroid.
Edwin Land, founder of Polaroid, splashed onto the scene with
the first instant photography camera in 1948. 66 The Polaroid instant
photography camera and Edwin Land's vision built a company that
few could criticize: in the 1970s Polaroid stock was listed among the
Nifty-Fifty group of most sought after stocks, Polaroid was on the
1993 list of "The Best 100 Companies to Work For," and it was one of
the first companies to offer work-family, domestic violence, and edu-
cation benefits to its employees. 67 Land led Polaroid through various
highs and lows throughout his tenure at the head of the company, but
all that came to an end in the late 1970s when Polavision, his latest
product, became the company's biggest failure. 68 Despite Polavision,
the employees remained loyal to Polaroid and Land's vision. Due to
this loyalty, employees rallied together to save the company about ten
years later when Disney launched a hostile takeover in 1988.69
Polaroid responded to Disney's attempt by forming an ESOP. To
fund the ESOP, Polaroid borrowed $300 million and placed it in the
ESOP.70 Polaroid then issued new stock, which the ESOP purchased
at market price.71 At the same time, Polaroid deducted 8 percent of its
employees' salaries to pay for the stock and reduce the debt.72 The
speed with which Polaroid was able to institute the ESOP made Dis-
ney's takeover attempt futile.73 However, I think that if the employees
knew then what they know now, they might have opted for the take-
over.
The mandatory ESOP continued until Polaroid filed for bank-
ruptcy in 2001.14 Under the program, Polaroid would automatically
invest 8 percent of an employee's salary in company stock that the
66. Steven Syre, Polaroid Slowly Fades Away But at One Time Edwin Land and His Auda-
cious Firm Could do No Wrong, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14,2001, at El.
67. Diane E. Lewis, Once a Workplace Trailblazer, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 2001, at E5;
Syre, supra note 66.
68. Syre, supra note 66.
69. Jeffrey Krasner, Paying the Price for Polaroid's Risk: Stock that Workers Bought to
Save Firm Now Nearly Worthless, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2001, at D1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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employee was generally not allowed to sell while working for the
company. 5 These restrictions created problems for the employees
that remained with the company until bankruptcy: they could not sell
the stock when it started to decline, even though they knew that the
company's economic difficulties were threatening their jobs and their
retirement savings.7 6 The employees who were forced to invest 8 per-
cent of their salary in company stock for as many as thirteen years
saw their stocks delisted in October 2001. 77 Many of these employees
were laid off at the same time that the stock lost its value.78
The employees who stayed with Polaroid until they lost their jobs
and much of their investments are not the only ones who suffered
financially when Polaroid fell on hard times. In an effort to save the
company, Polaroid reduced benefits to retirees at a time when their
investments, if still in Polaroid stock, were quickly losing value.79
Although Polaroid's ESOP required more of an investment from
its employees than many other ESOPs, the story is the same.80 Em-
ployees that are dependent on one company for their income and
their pension stand to lose everything when the company falls on hard
times.81 The absence of education about under-diversification is a
chronic source of employee confusion and disappointment. Ten years
ago, when I was very involved in the subject known then as "socially
responsible investing," it seemed obvious to me that pension invest-
ment decisions which were motivated by anything other than
risk/return considerations were scary indeed. I remember describing
"back-yard" investment schemes that were designed to keep inves-
tors' money in a particular state or region of the country so as to pro-
75. Id.
76. Id. Daniel J. O'Neill participated in the Polaroid ESOP for all thirteen years. In 1997,
Polaroid stock hit its high and his stock was worth more than $60,000. However, in October
2001, those shares, combined with O'Neill's subsequent investments in the ESOP, were worth
about $600. Id.
77. Jeffrey Krasner, NYSE to Delist Polaroid Shares, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 16,2001, at D2.
78. Krasner, supra note 69.
79. Jeffrey Krasner, Polaroid Offers Apology, Options to Retirees Abruptly Left Uninsured,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2001, at D3; Jeffrey Krasner, State Attorney General May Act on
Behalf of Polaroid Employees, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19,2001, at C1.
80. Most companies that have ESOPs offer the ESOP as an addition to employee benefits.
Polaroid, however, required employees to take part in the program. The culture that Land
cultivated at Polaroid is part of the reason that Polaroid was able to institute such a mandatory
program. Krasner, supra note 69.
81. For example, the employees of Dan River, Inc. agreed to forego their profit sharing,
stock bonus plan, and pensions in order to participate in an ESOP in 1983. Six years later, the
company agreed to a take over after laying off 59 percent of its employees. Krasner, supra note
69.
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duce the twin benefits of more jobs and great investment returns.82
These programs failed then because of an obstinate refusal to respect
the diversification principle; I am astonished that we continue to see
examples of concurrent job and pension loss due to pension plans that
are heavy with the plan-sponsor's stock.
II. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
A. A Framework for Thinking About These Issues
I remember that when I first began to do ERISA work about fif-
teen years ago, I had to scramble for good reading and background
material because I never took a law school course on employee bene-
fits. After consulting many business school textbooks and Harvard
Business School case studies, it became clear to me that, at least from
the perspective of management, benefits simply are a part of the cost
of hiring and retaining a worker.83
Benefits represent a portion of the sum total of energy, time, and
monetary cost an employer invests in developing an employee into a
profitable agent of the organization. Benefits are merely a part of
total compensation. A commonly asserted management objective in
creating and maintaining pension plans and other benefits is to maxi-
mize those factors that increase employee loyalty and tenure. The
manager's goal is to generate sufficient productivity from an em-
ployee to cover the employee's entire compensation package, includ-
ing benefits, and still produce a profit.84
My experience in teaching and thinking about benefits issues has
led me to believe that focusing on benefits as just one component of
total compensation is particularly helpful in that it avoids the pitfall of
excess political baggage that tends to inject a great deal of emotion
and confusion into conversations about benefits reforms. 85 One can-
82. See Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing
Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
83. See generally BEAM & MCFADDEN, supra note 43, at 11-12 (explaining that a com-
pany's benefits system is usually designed around considerations of the benefits an employer
feels should be in the plan, how the plan should be funded, the provisions contained in the plan
for controlling costs, and how the employer intends to communicate the plan to employees).
84. Id. at 12.
85. Beam states that the "proper design" of an employee benefits plan is an evolving proc-
ess, rather than a one-time decision. Discussing benefits in terms of discrimination claims fo-
cuses on the idea that the employer makes a definitive, one-time decision to treat one employee
better than another for a reason other than merit. However, adhering to this perception ignores
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not understand why employers have failed to offer an important
benefit without looking at the labor market the employer competes in
and remembering that, in the United States, almost all of the benefits
that survey data suggests are important to workers are discretionary.
That is, employers are free to offer a compensation package that is all
cash and no benefits if they wish. (The notable exceptions on the
mandatory side are Social Security and Medicare, unemployment
insurance, and workers compensation.)
In order to figure out how to get more employers to offer health
insurance, or childcare benefits, for example, it is necessary to first
understand why they are not doing so as part of the normal give and
take of the hiring and negotiation process. In other words, if the bene-
fit in question is as valuable as its proponents suggest, why are work-
ers unable to successfully demand it? To answer this, we have to focus
on the total compensation framework and the decline in union den-
sity.
I propose thinking about benefits from a purely economic point
of view because all other conversations tend, in my experience, to be
unproductive given the ever-present reality in the U.S. that employers
are free to avoid all discretionary benefits and simply pay cash for the
labor it needs. I would like to suggest that childcare, health insurance,
disability insurance, and a host of other benefits are best discussed
exclusively in terms of cost, worker productivity and competi-
tion/worker retention issues. This is preferable to a conversation fo-
cused on employer conspiracy theories about hostility to women
(blatant or thinly veiled), the disabled, or anyone else, in part because
it allows for a discussion that holds out the hope of producing worka-
ble proposals for improvement. Even if an employer refuses to offer,
for example, short term disability benefits (which are overwhelmingly
the provenance of new mothers), I suggest that we think creatively
about how to create incentives for such a benefit to be offered, rather
than focusing on the possible hostility to female workers which may
well account for the situation.
Although I will focus below on health insurance, pension bene-
fits, and fiduciary duty cases, the analysis I suggest is applicable to
other contexts. The suggested improvements try to do two things:
first, they make benefit plans more widely available to workers who
wish to participate, and second, they align employer and plan incen-
the fact that the employee-employer relationship is constantly changing due to factors that
change the financial and work-output needs of both the employees and the employer. Id.
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tives in a way designed to honor the legitimate expectations of all
parties.
B. Union Density
As I mentioned at the outset, one of the reasons I include the de-
cline in union density in this discussion is that I believe it signals a
general loss of labor's power in the marketplace. This loss makes forc-
ing employers to offer the benefits employees desire virtually impos-
sible. Because employees lack the power to force a solution on
employers, we need a solution employers can be persuaded to accept.
If union density was on the rise in the private sector, organized labor
could simply negotiate a better benefits climate for itself and others.
But this is not the case.
Returning to my framework, any feasible solution must consider
that employers ultimately need to generate a profit. Recall the culture
at Polaroid where generous benefits were the norm for many years.
8 6
Slowing the decline in union density, if that is even feasible at
this point, would almost certainly force employers to respond to em-
ployee demands for various benefits. It is interesting to note that the
rise in union density in the public sector in the U.S. has brought, to
those workers, some of the most generous and least costly (to the
workers) benefits plans of any group of employees. I confess that I
am not sanguine about this route to improving access to benefits. I
see no indication whatsoever that organized labor is poised to make a
comeback in the private sector, although it seems that predictions to
that effect are made a couple of times every year. More wishful think-
ing than anything else, only a change in the trend known as "global-
ization," as well as a marked increase in desire to be union members
by the American workforce, will reverse the present trend against
union membership.
C. What to do About Health Insurance
One of the most serious problems facing the benefits community
is the growing population that lacks health insurance. 7 Of course, any
86. See Krasner, supra note 69 ("Because of the culture Land [Polaroid's founder] had
created, employees remained fiercely loyal eight years after he stepped down and were willing
to make sacrifices." [referring to the willingness of employees to take a salary cut to fund an
ESOP to thwart Disney's hostile takeover bid]).
87. See Bruce Japsen, 43.6 Million in US are Uninsured: Numbers Grow for 2nd Year, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 30, 2003, at C1 (stating that 14.6 percent of the American population did not have
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realistic proposal to increase health insurance coverage must be po-
litically feasible and must ultimately make health insurance afford-
able to employers and employees. I will briefly describe two possible
approaches. These are small employer purchasing groups 88 and cash-
for-benefits.89
1. Small Employer Purchasing Groups
Small employer purchasing groups are an increasingly popular
method for controlling health care costs so that employers and em-
ployees can afford to buy coverage. 9° However, for all their successes,
there are critics and stories of failure.
Small employer purchasing groups, in the form of association
health plans ("AHPs"), 91 have been the subject of much debate, both
in Washington D.C. and in the popular media. On March 6, 2003,
Senator Snow (R-ME) introduced a bipartisan bill, the Small Busi-
ness Health Fairness Act of 2003, to amend ERISA to give small
medical insurance at any point during 2001, and 15.2 percent of the population, about 43.6
million people, did not have health insurance in 2002).
88. See generally Mary Campbell, Health Options Growing: Costs Are Going Up, But Small
Businesses Not Helpless, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/YourBusiness/
smallbizbuilder00110l.html (Aug. 4, 2003).
There are already many organizations claiming to reduce small companies' health-
insurance premiums.... Some companies have formed their own associations, negoti-
ating directly with health care providers, but generally they've found that administra-
tion costs devour most of the savings.... Another way to gain bargaining clout is tojoin a professional employer organization ("PEO"). PEOs provide an array of rea-
sonably priced employer benefits and safeguards, but business owners must give up
most of their autonomy. In effect, the PEO becomes the employer and "leases out" the
employees.
Id. According to Campbell, medical savings accounts are also a viable route to gaining afford-
able health coverage. However, "the response has been lukewarm." Id.
89. Two other prominent proposals for health care reform are a universal health care
system and rate regulation. Former Democratic presidential candidate Richard Gephardt (D-
MO) promoted a universal health care system. See Kristen Sawada, Insurers, Lawmakers Clash
over Health Care, PACIFIC BUSINESS NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, available at
http://www.pacific.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2002/01/14/story3.html ("Rate regulation
would allow a second source to review the price calculations of health plans, ensure that money
collected is directly applied to providing medical care and to have a legal floor against inade-
quate rates.").
90. The focus is on small employers because although 99 percent of companies that employ
more than 200 people offer health benefits, only 61 percent of companies with fewer than 200
employees do so. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2002 ANNUAL SURVEY 3, 4, 9, 32 (2002), available at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health-cast/uploaded-files/ACF4D95.pdf.
91. AHPs are group health plans sponsored by trade, industry, or professional associations,
or by chambers of commerce. The plans must meet ERISA certification requirements, since
ERISA preempts state law regulation of qualified AHPs. Small Business Health Fairness Act of
2003, H.R. 660 § 801-02, 108th Cong. (2003).
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businesses better access to health care insurance. 92 On June 19, 2003,
the House of Representatives approved a measure that would allow
national associations to make insurance plans available to their mem-
bers.93 However, because the House of Representatives passed similar
measures three times in the past and each time the Senate chose not
to take up the bill, it is difficult to predict whether the measure will
pass the Senate.94 Despite the Senate's previous inaction on such bills,
the political climate presently appears to be amenable to Snowe's bill:
President George W. Bush signaled his support for the measures in a
recent letter to the House of Representatives:
I support legislation that would make it easier for small businesses
to offer health coverage options to their employees. Through Asso-
ciation Health Plans, small businesses could pool together to offer
group plans to all of their employees, like those available to large
businesses. In addition, we are working to streamline small business
regulations and paperwork. To this end, I issued an Executive Or-
der that requires all Federal regulatory agencies to minimize these
burdens on our Nation's small businesses. 95
The success of small purchasing groups is grounded in their abil-
ity to consolidate employer bargaining power in a manner similar to
unions. Under these purchasing alliances, small business employers
band together to act as a larger employer for purposes of buying
health insurance for employees. From the point of view of an insur-
ance company, the law of large numbers makes a larger group of
workers a lower-risk entity than a smaller group. 96 The more people
covered by one plan, the lower the risk for an insurance company that
medical costs the employees incur will be out of line with industry
averages. 97 Hence, insurance companies are more willing to negotiate
92. S. 545, 108th Congress (2003).
93. J.K. Wall, Health Care Costs are Headache, Small Businesses Seek Remedy for Rising
Insurance Premiums, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 18, 2003, at Cl.
94. Association Health Plans: House OKs 4th Version of Insurance Bill, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 20,
2003, at 2 (Bus.) (for the fourth time, the House passed a resolution allowing for association
health plans, but the Senate is yet to take up the bill).
95. 149 CoNG. REC. H. 8245 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003) (White House proclamation). Re-
publican control of both Houses of Congress and the White House suggests that the provisions
have a chance of succeeding because conservatives, as compared to liberals, are more likely to
endorse purchasing pools. Dana Milbank, Bush Outlines Health Plan, Raises Funds, WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 2002, at A2.
96. See Rick Curtis, Rafe Forland, & Ed Neuschler, The Potential for a Small-Employer
Purchasing Pool in Wisconsin: Issues and Options for Overcoming Barriers to the Development
of the Private Employer Health Care Coverage Program (PEHCCP) at 2 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.rwhc.com/papers/IHPSPurchasingPool.pdf.
97. "[O]nly 5% of the population consistently accounts for over half of total health care
costs." Id.
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favorable rates for larger groups because they can better predict their
risk exposure.
Supporters of AHPs advocate for change based in part on two
large problems: first, the exceedingly high cost of health insurance
sometimes forces employers to turn away the best job candidates, and
second, the market for reasonably priced health insurance has created
a situation in which agents are selling fraudulent policies.
All of us know that it is generally illegal to refuse to employ a
person based merely on age or physical incapacities. However, some
small employers report they feel compelled to consider the effect a
particular job applicant will have on the company's health insurance
premiums. Hiring a person who is over age fifty-five or a person that
has an obvious health problem will result in higher premiums.98 Some
small business owners realize that they simply cannot afford to hire
such candidates because they will no longer be able to provide their
employees with health benefits.
Some have surveyed the landscape and determined that they can
successfully prey on people's desire for affordable health coverage.
These opportunists offer unlicensed plans through agents that appear
to be reputable. 99 These unlicensed plans claim to be regulated by
ERISA and exempt from state law. 1°° The reality is that only plan
sponsors can offer ERISA plans.1 1 The agents convince the employ-
ers that this is a legitimate way to buy insurance with other employ-
ers. 102 The agents do not tell potential customers that such
arrangements must be licensed by the state and can only offer li-
censed insurance policies. 103 Falling victim to a health insurance scam
may place a small employer in an even worse position than not offer-
ing insurance in the first place because the employer is potentially
98. Joe Manning, Health Care Relief for Small Firms Backed; Mayor's Panel Calls for
Introducing Competition, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jun, 27, 2002, at 1D; Insurance Woes;
Proposed 'Association Health Plans' for Pooling Small Businesses' Health Care Plans Would be
Counterproductive, PITISBURGH POST-GAZETE, Jun. 10, 2003, at C-11 (noting that the pool of
preferred health insurance risks is comprised of twenty-something single white males).
99. Julie Appleby, More Patients Get Stuck with the Bills: Unlicensed Insurers Prey on
People Desperate for Lower Rates, USA TODAY, May 1, 2002, at 3B. One particular victim
bought scam insurance from an agent that he knew; this man found himself with $50,000 of debt
that the plan would not pay. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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liable if the plan fails.0 4 Although the state and federal governments
are taking action against these frauds, more needs to be done.105
Despite the need for change and all the potential benefits of
small employer purchasing groups in the form of AHPs, there are
numerous obstacles which have prevented the system from becoming
widespread. Probably the most ominous obstacle is federal law: Title I
of ERISA does not allow pools of unrelated employers or workers'
associations to offer self-funded insurance plans.16 A congressional
amendment to Title I of ERISA would allow these pools to operate
regardless of state regulations because ERISA preempts state laws
that "regulate insurance." The Small Business Health Fairness Act of
2003 aims to do just this.107
However, allowing insurance groups to operate outside of state
regulations concerns some commentators. State health insurance
regulations require certain insurers to offer particular coverage,
known as mandates. °8 Without these, many people may not realize
that what they once thought were standard coverage provisions are
no longer included in their policies.1 9 It is easy to foresee a number of
employers offering only minimal coverage if the Small Business
Health Fairness Act of 2003 becomes law. 110
Additionally, proponents of the Small Business Health Fairness
Act of 2003 must overcome criticism and stories of past failures. One
biting criticism is that small purchasing alliances do not result in pre-
104. Id.
105. The Texas Insurance Commissioner, the government of Florida, and the Department of
Labor have all taken steps to prevent agents and companies from perpetuating these frauds. Id.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000). Although ERISA does limit multiple-employer insurance
arrangements, "[legitimate multiple-employer arrangements that purchase insurance [do exist].
But they generally must be registered with the states and offer licensed insurance products."
Appleby, supra note 99.
107. S. 545, 108th Congress (2003).
108. See Michelle Andrews, Paying a Price for Pared-Down Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
15, 2003, at (Bus.) 9:
Many mandates deal with preventive measures like screening for breast, colon or pros-
tate cancer; regular doctor visits and immunizations for children; and supplies and edu-
cation for diabetics. They may also address treatment for alcohol and substance-abuse,
or reproductive-health concerns like infertility treatments, contraception and mater-
nity coverage. Some mandates say who must be covered: for example, they may forbid
an insurer from dropping dependent disabled children from their parents' policies after
they reach adulthood.
109. Id. (noting that mandates give consumers confidence in the coverage a plan offers; they
establish a standard).
110. While the Texas governor was considering an AHP bill, Mr. Jones, a small business
owner, was already determining which health insurance provisions he would eliminate. His top
picks were coverage for H.I.V., AIDS, mental illness, contraceptives, and infertility. Id.
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miums that are competitive with the premiums charged by insurance
companies in the open market. The critics point to various studies
that show that allowing insurance plans to operate outside of state
mandates does not necessarily result in lower prices because these
mandates are not the driving force behind the price of insurance."1
Critics are also happy to claim that these plans are not the an-
swer because some plans have failed. One such story comes out of the
West Bend Area Chamber of Commerce.1 2 The West Bend Area
Chamber of Commerce established a coalition through which small
business owners could purchase health insurance together."3 The fatal
problem arose when the health insurance companies determined
which businesses were a better health insurance risk and then lured
the healthier companies out of the pool with more competitive
rates.1
1 4
I do not mean to suggest that a few failures condemn all small
employer purchasing efforts. However, it is important to note that not
all experience has been positive with these plans.1 5
2. Cash-for-Benefits
As an alternative to association health plans, I would like to pro-
pose a more controversial system of "cash-for-benefits." This is a sys-
tem in which employees could trade their earned wages, usually
111. In 2000, Milliman USA found that state insurance mandates are responsible for less
than 6.5 percent of the health insurance premiums in Texas. In the same year, the Congressional
Budget Office made a similar determination. It found that exempting insurance plans from state
mandates would result in a premium decrease of less than 5 percent. According to Jonathan
Gruber, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist, a 5 percent reduction in premiums
will only result in 3 percent more small employers offering health insurance. Id.
112. John Torinus, State Pool for Catastrophic Health Costs Worth a Look, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 14, 2003, at 3D.
113. Id.
114. Id. A similar result occurred after the Milwaukee Association of Commerce established
a similar plan. Colorado's Cooperative for Health Insurance Purchasing ("CHIP") also failed.
However, CHIP failed because the insurance companies pulled out of the pool. The insurance
companies chose not to continue doing business in this manner because it was no longer profit-
able for them. Marsha Austin, Small Firms Lose Low-Cost Health Care Option, Anthem Leaves
Co-op; 17,000 Forced to Switch, DENVER POST, May 21, 2002, at C-1.
115. See Employee Health Care Access Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 627.6699(6) (West Supp.
2003). Small employer carriers must use a modified community rating methodology in which the
premium for each small employer is determined solely on the basis of the eligible employee's
and eligible dependent's gender, age, family composition, tobacco use, or geographic area.
Rating factors related to age, gender, family composition, tobacco use, or geographic location
may be developed by each carrier to reflect the carrier's experience. The factors used by carriers
are subject to office review and approval.
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overtime wages, in return for benefits. 116 This approach may be par-
ticularly attractive to two wage-earner families: one person works for
money, the other works for benefits.
As part of a cash-for-benefits system, employees and employers
could enter into waiver agreements to modify the current minimum
wage"17 and overtime arrangements. I imagine the system would work
as follows: an employee is willing to work fifteen hours of overtime
each week at less than time and half to "buy" access to group health
insurance for his family. Alternatively, a worker could contract for
less than the minimum wage in return for the employer financing the
employee's health plan. I imagine these arrangements would be most
attractive to two wage-earner families.118
I recognize that there may be real problems associated with a
cash-for-benefits arrangement, and I'll note a few here. First, the sys-
tem may complicate Social Security and unemployment insurance
benefits calculations. Changing the payments an employee makes to
such programs might undesirably alter the levels of received benefits.
Second, a cash-for-benefits system could also reduce an employee's
pension. Accepting a reduced salary may result in an employee re-
ceiving a smaller pension upon retirement. Third, changes in salary
also affect tax liabilities. The design of a cash-for-benefits system
would have to account for tax credits: is it possible that receiving less
pay would negatively impact a taxpayer's eligibly for working tax
credits or child tax credits? 1 9
Fourth, the proposal may also cause some concern because of the
potential for workers to be paid less than the statutory minimum
wage, a wage that many people believe to the socially acceptable
minimum payment. Is it unconscionable to allow a person to work for
less than the socially acceptable minimum wage? People who enter
into a cash-for-benefits arrangement would not actually be working
116. See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 104 F.3d 105 (7th Cir. 1997). United Air-
lines came to an agreement with various employees' unions whereby the employees' retirement
plan would gain voting control of the company and majority equity ownership in exchange for
accepting substantially lower wages and fringe benefits for a substantial period of time.
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000).
118. See David Shactman & Stuart H. Altman, Council on the Economic Impact of Health
System Change, A Study of the Decline in Employment-Based Health Insurance at 3 (May 1,
1995). Those making the smallest salary also are the least likely to be insured (of those making
less than $5.00 per hour, only 14 percent are insured; only 38 percent of those making $5.00-
$7.49, 62 percent of those making $7.50-$9.99, 72 percent of those making $10.00-$14.99, and 83
percent of those making $15.00 or more per hour are insured).
119. Id.
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for less than minimum wage. The difference between what the em-
ployee receives in a paycheck and the minimum wage would be spent
on health insurance. Essentially, it is as if the employee used his pay-
check to buy health insurance. However, under my proposal the em-
ployer would make premium payments.
Fifth, there are concerns that the cash-for-benefits system would
negatively impact the employee's ability to enter into major financial
transactions, such as securing a mortgage. Some mortgagees deter-
mine the amount of money to offer a particular mortgage applicant
based in part on the applicant's gross salary. 20 The irony is that al-
though a party to a cash-for-benefits system will have a lower gross
income than he did prior to entering the program, he may have more
disposable income because his employer secured health insurance for
him at a lower rate than he could obtain on his own.
The most obvious solution to many of these concerns is making a
cash-for-benefits system available to employees on a voluntary basis.
In keeping with basic notions about freedom of contract, the em-
ployer and the employee would generally be free to agree to contract
terms they find mutually satisfactory.
D. What to do About Pensions
1. Varity and Sub-Optimal Deterrence
Varity was in many respects a garden-variety fraud case. This
kind of fraud, I have suggested, stems in part from the absence of
traditional punitive damages for plaintiffs in ERISA cases. 2' Section
502 of ERISA provides that retirement plan participants may bring a
civil action against the fiduciary of an employee benefit plan to obtain
"appropriate" equitable relief.122 Courts generally have interpreted
"appropriate" equitable relief in a manner that precludes punitive
120. Lynn Brenner, Family Finance: Purchasing a Home will Reduce Tax Bill, NEWSDAY
(New York), Sept. 3, 2000, at F3 ("Mortgage lenders don't want your monthly housing cost-
mortgage payment, property taxes, and homeowners insurance-to exceed 35 percent of your
monthly gross income.").
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2000); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
(1979); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 63; David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney, & Menahem
Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
1(1990).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(3).
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awards except under exceptional circumstances. 123 An employee that
establishes that the employer or plan administrator breached the
ERISA-imposed fiduciary duty must still prove that equitable relief is
the only sufficient manner of providing relief.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states, "[p]unitive damages
are damages... awarded against a person to punish him for his out-
rageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.' 1 24 Although I am not aware of empirical stud-
ies that prove punitive damages deter specific conduct, the legal
community generally accepts that punitive damages can be an effec-
tive deterrent.
Economic analysis of judgments and human behavior also sup-
port the idea that punitive damages are an effective deterrent.'
25
Polinsky and Shavell convincingly argue that punitive damages are
necessary in the specific instances of wrongdoers that might escape
liability for their culpable conduct. 26 Their argument is that punitive
damages will not deter a potential defendant that is sure to be
caught. 2 17 However, punitive damages should be awarded when there
is a chance that a wrongdoer will not be caught-this is the scenario
in which punitive damages will be most effective and economic. 128 The
legal system must impose a deterrent in such situations because an
economically rational actor will consider his chances for profit in light
of the chances that the legal system will hold him liable for his ac-
tions. 29 Punitive damages alter the scenario by accounting for this
123. See Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 498, 515 (1996) (equitable relief is only available to a
plaintiff when Congress did not provide other adequate remedies); see also Rothman, supra
note 41, at 938 (citing Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 656-61 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
former employees were entitled to equitable relief when a fiduciary repeatedly responded to
requests for distributions from employees' profit sharing plans with excessive hostility and
resistance)).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
125. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 63; Haddock, McChesney, & Spiegel, supra note
121.
126. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 63.
127. Id. at 878-87.
128. Id. at 887-900.
129. A party that knows he has a one in four chance of being held liable for a $100,000
injury has no incentive to reduce the chance of injury if the tool for reducing the probability of
injury is greater than $25,000. However, if the party knows that when he is found liable he will
be required to pay the cost of the damage, the cost of the control measure, and an additional
sum, he has incentive to impose the control measure beforehand. This scenario may result in
overdeterrence, but we can eliminate that concern by making the total damage award equal to
the damage caused multiplied by the inverse of the probability that the party will be held liable
for his action. Id. at 887-96.
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calculus-the more likely it is that a particular wrongdoer will escape
liability, the more punitive damages he must pay when held liable. 30
0 I believe that plan administrators are economically rational ac-
tors and that we, therefore, cannot expect optimal behavior from
these parties without an optimal level of offsetting sanctions and en-
forcement. Plan administrators know that there is a chance they will
not be held accountable for their actions. My impression is that in the
absence Of sufficiently strong sanctions, they may seize upon the op-
portunity for inappropriate profit. Even if you think Varity-like be-
havior is rare, it is hard to see why punitive damages should not be
available on those few occasions when plaintiffs need them."'
2. Under-Diversification
The debate many of us engaged in about socially responsible in-
vesting during the 1980s should have taught everyone two lessons:
first, we must be careful about wholesale change that is not carefully
thought through, and second, we must remember that most actors are
economically rational-i.e., regulators cannot simply force employers
to "behave," at least not without consequences.
Adequate diversification, like gravity and other laws of nature,
simply cannot be ignored. Plans which are heavy with employer stock
only expose participants to the double disaster of the Polaroid variety
when both jobs and retirement savings are wiped out at the same
time.
The many recent mini-collapses of the stock market are compel-
ling evidence for exercising considerably more care when investing
for the future. The next logical question we must answer is: What
constitutes handling employee stocks, pensions, and retirement plans
"more securely"? The mainstream economic argument for more se-
cure retirement assets runs in favor of more diverse investment port-
folios. I argue that in addition to deterring management from
mishandling employees' benefits and pension assets, we must pre-
scribe a better and more diverse method of investing these assets.
One of the keys to making these investments more secure is to un-
ravel the under-diversification that plagues many employees' pension
portfolios.
130. Id. at 887-900.
131. Current litigation concerning recent corporate infrastructure collapses of the Enron
and WorldCom variety highlight the need to make punitive remedies available when employees
bring ERISA-based actions against employers acting as plan administrators.
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The clear solution is a retreat from ESOP-like arrangements and
all retirement vehicles which contain more than 5 percent of em-
ployer equities. Although in some situations this will make pensions
more expensive for employers to offer, this is outweighed by the wis-
dom of not tying future pension income to an employees' current
income and job security, with its resulting risk of unemployment and
poverty of the elderly.
The extent to which a 401(k) plan is invested in employer stock
can heavily impact the success of such a plan.132 While investment
advisors generally counsel that an investment portfolio should contain
no more than five to fifteen percent of any single stock, 133 employees
in defined contribution plans invest on average thirty-three percent of
their plan assets in employer stock when it is offered as an investment
alternative.lM Over-investing in a single asset of a 401(k) portfolio
may jeopardize an employee's ability to retire; in addition to lacking
insulation against the loss in value of a portfolio's investment, an em-
ployer's misfortunes could also cause the loss of the employee's job.1 35
An employee may control the diversity of his portfolio, but the
success of the investments and the portfolio as a whole depends on
factors beyond the employee's control, factors such as the stock mar-
132. See generally W. Brantley Phillips, Jr., Note, Chasing Down the Devil: Standards of
Prudent Investment Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 335
(1997).
133. See, e.g., John Gin, Spread Eggs Among Baskets: Don't Own Too Much of Your Com-
pany, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 3, 2001, at (Mon.)-i (citing an August 1997
issue of Money magazine that recommends an investor limit investments in one stock to 10-20
percent). "
134. Id. (citing to the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, which found that on aver-
age, about 41 percent of an employee's 401(k) and profit sharing were invested in employers'
stock); see also Facts from Employee Benefit Research Institute, 401(k) Plan Account Balances,
Asset Allocation, and Loan Activity in 2001, at http://www.ebri.org/facts/0603fact.pdf (June
2003) (stating that according to the 2001 EBRI database, 401(k) participants had 16.8 percent of
their 401(k) plans invested in company stock); Albert B. Crenshaw, A 401(k) Post Mortem;
After Enron, an Emphasis on Company Stock Draws Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at
H1 (citing an Employee Benefit Research Institute study that found "at companies where the
employer match must be in company stock, company stock also makes up 33 percent of the
portion of the account that is the employee's choice," and the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of
America which found that among companies that have company stock in their 401(k) plans, "48
percent of findividuals] have between 10 percent and 50 percent in company stock, and 18
percent of [individuals] have more than 50 percent in company stock"); Janet Kidd Stewart,
Stocks Can Leave Few Options; Workers at Risk if They Can't Sell, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2002, at
Cl (citing a study that found approximately one-ninth of the plans in the study "had more than
60 percent of their plan assets invested in company stock" and reporting that more than 80
percent of the Abbott Laboratories 401(k) plan was invested in company stock).
135. See Phillips, supra note 132.
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ket and general economic conditions. 13 6 For example, while modern
portfolio theory protects an employee against the risk of market fluc-
tuations over the course of a career, the theory only minimizes in-
vestment losses during stock market declines.137 Therefore, an
employee properly using modern portfolio theory to invest 401(k)
plan assets may still accumulate an insufficient amount of assets for
retirement if a large part of an employee's career coincides with a
period of unsatisfactory market performance. 13 8
CONCLUSION
I think that some, although perhaps not all, of the benefits prob-
lems we face today present themselves so acutely because of the de-
cline in union density in the U.S. over the past half-century. There
are, of course, many other problems in the American workplace that
would present themselves differently were an organized workplace
the norm.
The central question facing the benefits community at this time is
how to make the provision of health insurance and pensions attractive
to the employer community which can, and frequently does, decline
to offer anything other than cash as compensation. I am of the view
that unions will not be making a comeback in the private sector any-
time soon. That said, what can be done with respect to increasing the
numbers of employees with health insurance? I offer two proposals.
First, we ought to look much more closely at the small employer pur-
chasing group experiments that are going on and focus on those that
are most successful. Second, I suggest we permit willing employers
and employees to bargain for compensation arrangements that are
now impermissible because of minimum wage and overtime laws.
Employees who wanted to could "purchase" health insurance with a
specified number of hours of uncompensated overtime or with a
lower hourly wage. I suspect that these arrangements would be attrac-
136. See Lewis D. Solomon & Karen C. Coe, Social Investments By Nonprofit Corporations
and Charitable Trusts: A Legal and Business Primer for Foundation Managers and Other Non-
profit Fiduciaries, 66 UMKC. L. REV. 213 (1997).
137. See Harry M. Markowtiz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 (1952) ("Diversification
cannot eliminate all variance ... in expected returns.").
138. See Solomon & Coe, supra note 136. For example, in October 1987, when the value of
stocks fell by one-third, equity-based 401(k) plans, notwithstanding modern portfolio theory,
inevitably lost approximately one-third of their value. This dramatic drop in the value of 401(k)
plans surely altered the ability of many employees to retire as planned. Accordingly, a 401(k)
plan's success, to an extent, depends on the state of the market at the time an employee's re-
tirement funds are distributed.
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tive to dual earner households; in effect one might work for wages
and the other for benefits. Finally, with respect to pension reform, the
recent spate of corporate scandals suggests that both the availability
of punitive damages under ERISA and new rules limiting the amount
of employer stock an employee's pension portfolio can carry would
be good first steps toward improving plan sponsor behavior and in-
creasing plan asset diversification.
The benefits world may be a scarier and more cynical place of
late, given recent revelations about corporate malfeasance and the
absence of strong, organized employee unions. It is not, though, a
place without any prospects for positive change and improvement.
Employers, for the most part, want to offer needed benefits and are
willing to do so if they can afford it, especially where evidence sug-
gests it enhances employee morale, retention, and loyalty. We cannot
expect, however, that employers will act contrary to their own basic
economic interests and offer benefits when the cost of doing so would
mean that total compensation will outweigh the value of the em-
ployee's marginal product. An employer that operates in that fashion
will not remain in business for long, and that, in turn, is an unattrac-
tive situation for everyone.
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